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1 Introduction*
Research on health inequalities is changing our
understanding of how people are affected by the
social structures in which they live. Differences in
death rates provide 'hard' data on the impact of
socio-economic inequalities on peoples lives.
Evidence of three-fold differences in death rates
between upper and lower social classes, or between
richer and poorer neighbourhoods, remind us of
how sensitive health continues to be to differences
in material circumstances - even in supposedly
affluent developed countries. Research over the last
15 or 20 years has shown that this mortality gradi-
ent results less from the direct effect of differences
in people's material circumstances than it does
from the psychosocial effects of those differences.
Although factors such as damp housing and inner
city air pollution do have direct effects on health,
much more important are the health effects of peo-
ple's subjective experience of their position in soci-
ety - whether it makes them feel successful,
optimistic, confident, or failures, socially excluded,
depressed, economically insecure and desperate.
The health gradient does not distinguish merely
between the poor and the rest of society: health
standards and life expectancy improve all the way
up the social ladder. So for instance, even in the
Whitehall Study of 17,000 civil servants working
in London offices, the most junior staff were found
to have death rates three times as high as the most
senior staff working in the same offices, with the
ranks in between having intermediate death rates
(Marmot 1984). Nor is this a matter of simply one
or two causes of death: with the exception of breast
and skin cancer, the vast majority of causes of
death are more common lower down the social
scale.
After the publication of the Black Report
Inequalities in Health in 1980, the first research
task was to check whether these health differences
were produced by a tendency for social mobility to
move the healthy upwards (and the unhealthy
down). It turned out that although there is a ten-
dency for this to happen, it makes only a small
contribution to health inequalities (Blane et al.
This is an abridged version of an article which first
appeared in Soundings (1997) and is reprinted with
permission.
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1993). Indeed, social mobility seems to reduce the
differences which would arise if everyone was
exposed to the same advantaged or disadvantaged
conditions throughout their lives.
The next research task was to look at the contribu-
tion of behavioural factors like smoking, unhealthy
food choices or lack of exercise. Again, while these
factors are influential, they leave most of the health
inequalities - even in diseases like heart disease -
unexplained. This is partly because there are only
very minor differences in fat consumption between
social classes, and partly because behavioural fac-
tors are less important than people imagine. Even if
you minimise your risks by getting all the behav-
ioural factors right, your most likely cause of death
is still heart disease.
Although there are very strong relationships
between almost any measure of health and almost
any measure of social and economic circumstances,
attempts to account for the bulk of this relationship
in terms of the toxic effects of exposure to haz-
ardous conditions have met with little success. It is
for instance difficult to see how poor housing could
increase the incidence of cardiovascular diseases or
cancers. Similarly, class differences in fat consump-
tion are much too small to explain any of the huge
differences in heart disease. However, psychosocial
factors, like having control over one's work and
domestic circumstances, job security, a regular
income, social support, the absence of long-term
difficulties and threatening life events, the quality of
parenting and lack of family conflict early in life, all
appear unexpectedly successful in explaining differ-
ences in physical disease. Epidemiological evidence
has pointed increasingly towards such psychosocial
factors, and the biological pathways through which
chronic stress - or worry - can effect the immune
and endocrine systems and increase the risks of a
wide range of diseases (Lovallo 1997).
2 Social Position
Thus, health is linked to material circumstances pri-
marily through psychosocial rather than direct
material pathways. This is confirmed by recent evi-
dence which shows that the relationship between
income and health is less a reflection of the impact
of absolute income levels on health as of the effects
of relative income. Living standards for the vast
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majority of people in the developed world have
long surpassed the levels at which absolute material
standards are the main limitation on health: what
matters now is where your income places you in the
social hierarchy
The health impact of social status is also powerfully
demonstrated by studies of non-human primates,
particularly among baboons and macaques. The
health impacts of social position seem to hinge on
the physiological repercussions of chronic stress
experienced by subordinate animals; this is strik-
ingly similar to the effects found among human
beings in low social status positions. Amongst the
monkeys and baboons it is possible to manipulate
social status experimentally, and so to confirm that
causality does indeed run from social status to the
physiological differences rather than the other way
round.
3 Income Inequality
Arising from the importance of relative income and
the effects of low social status is a marked tendency
for more egalitarian societies to be healthier. In the
developed world, it is not the richest societies like
the United States which are healthiest, but the ones
with smaller inequalities in income - like Japan and
Sweden. This relationship has now been found in
various data sets looking at international differences
(at a specific point in time, and at changes over
time). The same relationship has also been found
recently among the 50 American states: again it is
not the richest, but the most egalitarian, states
which have the lowest death rates. The most impor-
tant part of the explanation for this is almost cer-
tainly that greater equality reduces the burden of
relative deprivation on health. In effect, societies are
healthier where the hierarchy is less hierarchical.
The relationship between greater equality and bet-
ter health is surprisingly strong. If, as the statistics
suggest, it accounts for anywhere near half the dif-
ferences in life expectancy between developed
countries, the amount of inequality would be the
most powerful influence on population health yet
identified.
While there can be little doubt that the main health
benefits of greater equality accrue to the least well-
off, there may also be some knock-on effects of
living in a more egalitarian society that benefit the
rich. Although the major categories of cause of
death - including cancers, infections, cardiovascu-
lar and respiratory diseases - all tend to be more
common in more unequal societies, the causes
which respond most dramatically (in terms of
percentage changes) to the scale of income inequal-
ity are accidents, alcohol related causes, violence
and infections. These rather social causes suggest
that there are differences in the nature of the social
fabric and in risk behaviour between more and less
egalitarian societies. Even though the least well-off
will suffer most from the higher rates of homicide,
accidents and infections, the rich are unlikely to be
fully insulated from them or the social processes
behind them.
4 Social Cohesion
It seems then that death rates reflect the powerful
effects of inequality on the psychosocial welfare of
populations. But if income differences have a suffi-
ciently powerful effect on the social fabric to affect
death rates, they must surely also influence other
social problems. The much higher death rates from
alcohol related causes, accidents and violence in
less egalitarian societies already point the way to
other effects. Research has shown that homicide
rates are related to income inequality both interna-
tionally and in the USA where they explain an
important proportion of the nine-fold differences in
homicide rates in different states (Kaplan et al.
1996). Violent crime is similarly related but, at least
in some statistical series, property crime appears
less closely related. In Britain, overall crime rates
are so closely related to measures of deprivation
that it is hard to distinguish between maps of crime
and maps of deprivation. Japan is interesting here:
after income differences had narrowed during most
of the post-war period, by the end of the 1980s
Japan had the narrowest income differences and
highest life expectancy in the developed world. It
had also enjoyed a long-term decline in most cate-
gories of crime - particularly those associated with
deprived areas and lower socio-economic status.
Indeed, only categories of 'white collar' crime had
not declined.
In Britain, between 1979 and the early 1990s, the
proportion of children who came from homes in
which people live on less than half the average
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income grew from about ten per cent to over 30 per
cent. Much the most rapid part of this growth took
place after 1985. During that period, reading stan-
dards in primary schools declined, and research
showed that this had nothing to do with the use of
the reading methods (which various government
ministers had sought to blame); the watershed year
was 1985, and the deterioration was most apparent
in the inner cities and in schools with poor catch-
ment areas. In the same period there was also a
marked decline in the rate of improvement in death
rates among infants, children, and adults under 45.
Again, the poor performance was clearly concen-
trated in the most deprived areas.
If almost a third of children come from homes
below the poverty line, teaching and learning obvi-
ously become more difficult. Brought up by parents
coping with the increased stress of caring for chil-
dren with inadequate and insecure resources, levels
of tolerance and patience will be lower and children
will suffer more emotional and behavioural prob-
lems as a result. Because of the close links between
health and emotional welfare, domestic conflict in
childhood not only leads to poorer school perfor-
mance and to an increased willingness to resort to
violence, but also to worse health later in life.
A quite different short-term indicator of the effects
of widening income differences on psychosocial
welfare comes from smoking statistics. As the poor
got poorer, it. seems that - despite the expense -
they smoked more. The continuing long-term
decline in smoking among most of the population
was reversed among poorer men and women
(Marsh and McKay 1994). Just when their relative
poverty was increasing most rapidly, the poor
devoted a larger proportion of their income to
smoking. It is hardest to give up smoking when you
feel hopeless and least in control of your life.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that part of the
reason why more egalitarian societies are healthier
is that they tend to be more socially cohesive.
Several examples of unusually healthy and egalitar-
ian societies described in my Unhealthy Societies
- like Britain during the two World Wars, Japan,
and an Italian-American town called Roseto in
Pennsylvania - suggest that what may be important
is a sense of camaraderie, or something approaching
a community of values capable of ensuring that the
public space is a social space and that social life
does not stop outside the front door. The impres-
sion that something like social cohesion is involved
is strengthened by data, again, from the United
States. It shows that the relationship between
greater income equality and lower mortality rates is
mediated - at least in statistical terms - by the extent
to which people feel they can trust each other.
5 The Declining Importance of
Economic Growth
Thus the nature of the social environment appears
crucially important to human welfare. Since the so-
called 'epidemiological transition', when infectious
diseases gave way to the degenerative diseases as
the main causes of death, the grip which material
living standards used to have on mortality has loos-
ened. Infections remain the most common causes of
death in poorer countries, primarily because a
threshold of material status has not yet been
reached by a large proportion of their populations.
Indicatïve of the attainment of this threshold in the
developed world is that, in the later stages of the
decline in infections, a number of the so-called 'dis-
eases of affluence' reversed their social distributions
to become more common among the poor in afflu-
ent societies. Amongst others, coronary heart dis-
eases, stroke, lung cancer, duodenal ulcers and
obesity, from being most common among the rich,
became most common among the poor in affluent
societies. Throughout history the rich had been fat
and the poor thin, but with rising living standards
the poor could now afford to be fat. Obesity lost its
association with social status, ideas of physical
attractiveness changed, and the slimming industry
was born.
The decline of the infections, together with the way
the diseases of affluence became the diseases of the
poor in affluent societies, shows that the epidemio-
logical transition marks the attainment of minimum
material living standards for the bulk of the popu-
lation. This explains the subsequent weakness of
the link between rising life expectancy and eco-
nomic growth. Although life expectancy continues
to rise, how fast it does so now bears very little rela-
tionship to long-term economic growth rates.
Having attained a threshold standard of living con-
sistent with good health, economic growth does
much less for us than it once did. Although there is
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still homelessness and absolute material need, not
only is the proportion of the population affected too
small to influence population mortality rates, but
these problems have re-emerged despite economic
growth, partly as a result of widening income
differences.
A much more important source of the continuing
improvements in life expectancy than economic
growth are the social and cultural changes which,
though partly enabled by the dramatic reduction of
material need, sweep across the developed world,
largely unaffected by different growth rates. The
central features of this progress are likely to involve
the civilising processes of a general psychosocial
liberalisation. Its most easily identifiable outward
features - such as the abolition of the corporal pun-
ishment of schoolchildren - are reflections of
deeper processes. The same is true of the abolition
of capital punishment, the legalisation of homosex-
uality, the abolition of conscription, the greater
informality of social life at all levels and the grow-
ing recognition of the importance of our psycholog-
ical and emotional development. Indeed, it seems
likely that these factors move forward more rapidly
in more egalitarian societies. Here, the contrast
between countries like the United States and
Sweden with respect to issues like capital punish-
ment, is telling.
Going through the emerging picture of the social
determinants of health, it is difficult not to believe
that even more important than what society tells us
about health, is what health tells us about society
and the quality of life. (But note that although it is
easy to be dismissive of a few years extra life
expectancy in societies which already think of
themselves as overburdened by the proportion of
old people, most of the increase in life expectancy
has come from reducing deaths at younger ages.)
6 The Social Environment
The picture of health inequalities might have
looked much the same had we looked at other
social problems such as violent crime, the educa-
tional performance of schoolchildren, or drug tak-
ing. They - and social cohesion itself - are all
powerfully affected by the scale of relative depriva-
tion. We are dealing with the socially corrosive
effects of inequality on the real subjective quality of
life. The material problems of those on low incomes
have increased as a result of widening income dif-
ferences, rather than from a lack of economic
growth.
Our highly developed sensitivity to the social envi-
ronment is almost certainly attributable to the fact
that the quality of social relations has always been a
crucial determinant of human welfare. Other
human beings are potentially our most awesome
competitors, competing for the same food, housing,
sexual partners, jobs, even the shirt off our backs.
But equally, our fellow human beings have the
potential to be the greatest source of comfort, love,
solace, help and fellowship. The nature of social
relations must always have been crucial to human
welfare. Indeed, this is likely to be why the hunting
and gathering societies which dominated human
pre-history were 'assertively egalitarian' and usually
eschewed forms of exchange which were overtly
self-interested. The reliance on gift exchange and
food sharing almost certainly shows the importance
of investment in social relations. After all, 'gifts
make friends and friends make gifts'. Keeping on
friendly terms with other people and avoiding envy
and conflict were basic to survival and to the qual-
ity of life.
At the centre of the current contemplations about
the collapse of communist thought seems to be a
lack of any idea of a coherent alternative to the mar-
ket. The opposition between socialist values and the
market has been so central that we have often seen
the need to work out a coherent alternative to the
market as the precondition for any socialist or
humanitarian society The central problem is the
way the exploitative and overtly self-interested
rationale of the market conflicts with the mutuality
which is fundamental to social relations. The
impossibility of inventing an alternative to the mar-
ket has politically immobilised many who recognise
the need for a more social society
But even market societies can develop in very dif-
ferent ways. It is only too easy to imagine a future
in a divided society, in which the rich live in pro-
tected enclaves, while the poor themselves are left
to hopelessness and the fight for whatever meagre
resources are left to them. Fortunately, it is also easy
to imagine a more egalitarian and cohesive future in
a society which has invested in the education and
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welfare of the whole population and, by enabling
new forms of social expression, sows the seeds of a
more social future. There are already examples of
such societies. The more egalitarian societies such
as those of Japan or Sweden contrast sharply with
the much more violent inegalitarian countries like
the United States or the even more divided but
poorer societies such as South Africa, Brazil,
Columbia and perhaps even Russia. The immediate
political task is to ensure that we take the more
social path.
We stand at the watershed between these two
courses. With future hindsight, perhaps the choice
of this new Labour government will prove to have
been the moment when the decision to take the
more social route was taken; but the political
changes in Britain have been bound up with the
wider demise of a monetarist approach, an eco-
nomic theory associated with a pessimistic theory of
human motivation and of society, providing the ide-
ological underpinnings of the political right. This
was beginning to look like a played out force before
the end of the 1980s; the size of the Labour victory
simply reflecting how far it had got beyond its sell-
by date. Its moral and social bankruptcy had
become plain in the government's disregard for
increasing relative poverty and in the frequent signs
of corruption in public office.
7 Equality, Cohesion and
Economic Growth
Particularly timely in terms of the possibility for
developing a more social economy is a change in
thinking on the relationship between greater equal-
ity and economic growth. One of the most impor-
tant obstacles to reducing income inequalities, and
indeed one of the reasons why recent governments
allowed them to grow, was the belief that inequality
was a stimulus to effort and economic growth. Now,
however, most of the ground for that wisdom has
been swept away There are at least four studies
using independent data which all suggest that more
egalitarian societies have faster growth rates (Glyn
and Miliband (eds) 1994). Indeed, the signs are of
a new economic orthodoxy which says that equity
is good for growth (Osberg 1995). The shift in
opinion has even started to percolate into the World
Bank. Explanations of the association between
equity and faster growth range from issues to do
with the expense and wastage of 'human resources'
caused by relative poverty and the failure to invest
in people, to the ways in which trust and better
social cohesion lubricate the workings of society so
reducing a firm's 'external costs'.
These changes in the empirical evidence and the
new thinking are crucially important: they tell us
not only that we do not face a choice between going
under in the face of international competition or
accepting the social costs of greater inequality, but
that our economic position is likely to improve as a
result of tackling the social divisions in our society
If inequality and the destructive effects of relative
poverty lower society's productivity, then the need
for economic efficiency becomes a socially progres-
sive force. Economic efficiency means raising edu-
cational standards throughout the population, it
means improving social cohesion and ensuring that
people are able to develop their productive potential.
What is true at the societal level may also be true in
terms of the social organisation of work. Rather
than reducing efficiency, a more cohesive and egali-
tarian ethos which improved working relationships
seems likely to improve productivity Consider the
implications of a situation (shown in the Whitehall
Studies) in which death rates are three times as high
among the most junior as among the most senior
office staff. What does it mean if sickness absences
are six times as high among the most junior staff
(North et al. 1993)? The problem for employers is
twofold: poor health is expensive; but also, the
most important causes of health differences at work
are things like the amount of control people have
over their work, their security, the social support
they get from colleagues, their self-esteem, anger
and depression. These are all quite closely related to
morale, and it is likely that people are less produc-
tive where morale is low. Therefore, business inter-
ests can no longer afford to ignore health
inequalities. Employees will have better morale, will
be healthier and will make a bigger contribution to
the Organisation's efficiency if they feel valued
instead of used, and are able to combine a sense of
purpose in their work with greater control over it.
Although firms already try to foster a sense of com-
mitment and loyalty in their staff, having a sense of
purpose about one's work and feeling a valued
member of a team are surely ultimately
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incompatible with a structure of exploitative
employer/employee relationships. Finding a resolu-
tion to these issues may well tend to favour firms
which move closer to some form of industrial
democracy Emancipated and purposeful human
beings function better, and the institutional
arrangements which foster their emancipation will
have a competitive advantage.
The astonishing flexibility of capitalism and the
market means that they need not be incompatible
with economic democracy (a term which can cover
a wide range of institutional forms including the
election of directors and chief executives by
employees - essentially making bosses accountable
to employees - to more cumbersome arrangements
for involving employees more directly in decision
making). Already a great deal of capital is, like the
pension funds, is owned by institutions, and there
are examples of pension funds controlled by the
members whose pensions they manage. Firms con-
trolled democratically by employees would be per-
fectly capable of raising capital by paying agreed
interest rates without having to give control to the
providers of loans; and investors would be able to
make their assessments of risk and act accordingly
There are numerous opportunities for social
progress to which the market mechanism itself may
not be an obstacle. lt is important to distinguish
between opposition arising from the institutional
power of the privileged and the effects of the mar-
ket mechanism itself. Indeed, the vested interests of
the privileged often act as a brake on the more
democratic tendencies in the market. It was this
democratic aspect of the market which made Tom
Paine see free trade as a counter to the institution-
alised power of the aristocracy, and perhaps
explains why the rapid economic growth among the
so-called Asian 'tiger' economies started only after
the combined effects of the Second World War and
the struggle with communism had weakened or
removed the previous ruling elites and ushered in a
number of social reforms, including greater equality
9 Socialising the Market
In the absence of an alternative to the market, the
social fabric depends on the extent to which the
market can be socialised. Few of the progressive
features of market societies have come about
directly as a result of the unfettered working of the
market. Most have involved political organisation,
trade unions, energetic campaigns and the use of
legislative power. Democratisation of economic life,
the development of egalitarian working
relationships, and more cohesive societies, are not
only winnable within the prevailing system, but are
made all the more urgent by the demands of eco-
nomic efficiency Without social reform, the market,
guided only by the institutionalised power of the
rich, would jeopardise not only the real quality of
life, but also the social and economic progress of
our society
In material practice we become ever more interde-
pendent as we produce goods and services for the
use of others and rely for the satisfaction of almost
all our needs on what others - all over the world -
produce. This social activity will need to be co-ordi-
nated by the market until our sociality is sufficiently
developed for us to be able to act directly in relation
to the social purposes inherent in it. But it is surely
imaginable that, as we grow to experience ourselves
as gaining a sense of purpose from working on
equal terms with others in a cohesive society, that
we will also start being able to reduce reliance on
the market in other areas. If so, the humanisation of
society will depend more on pushing back the
boundaries of the market. By expanding the sphere
of interactions which we experience as social, egal-
itarian and humanistic - rather than as anti-social
market transactions - we will increase our social
capacities, so paving the way for further advances
and a fuller realisation of our human sociality
There is now strong evidence from evolutionary
psychology that we have genetically enshrined
capacities for living co-operatively based on rela-
tions of 'reciprocal altruism': a tendency to feel
indebted, to reciprocate gifts, and to be intolerant of
freeloaders (Ridley 1996). The dominance of gift
exchange and food sharing among hunter-gatherers
depended on the power of the gift to create a sense
of indebtedness and the need to make a return gift.
These patterns of meaning are human characteris-
tics found in all societies. But they extend more
widely and more deeply than the aspects of reci-
procity most directly involved in reciprocal gift
exchange. Contributing to the welfare of others
brings with it a sense of having a role and a function
in relation to others, a sense of self-worth and self-
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realisation. Contributing voluntarily to the welfare
of others is self-validating and provides a sense of
meaning in a way which activity motivated by the
self-interested rationale of the market often cannot.
It is the unmediated and inherently social links
which are most fundamentally inconsistent with the
market. Our capacity for reciprocal altruism is the
basis of social relations and was once the basis of
social organisation. Membership of the sharing
group was also the nearest thing to a guarantee of
security It seems increasingly likely that the social
environment most conducive to good health will
turn out to be one in which people are bound
together by relations of practical reciprocity, and
daily life is organised in a way which makes more of
that reciprocity apparent. The deep social needs
illustrated by the health patterns with which this
article started probably depend for their satisfaction
on experiencing ourselves as part of a web of
human relations, providing mutual support
through reciprocal altruism.
10 The Quality of the Social
Environment
Titmuss's work on blood donors indicates the
potential for reciprocal altruism to find wider
expression. An essential part of the socialisation of
life involves expanding the areas of working life and
life on the streets which are egalitarian and socially
mediated. This includes not only areas like health
services which are free to users, but also a huge
range of voluntary work. It is not simply a matter of
an intimate cocoon of social relationships for each
of us; it is also a matter of social inroads into the
public life of society, of finding ways of making the
public space more of a social space. Perhaps provi-
sions such as free urban public transport would
serve to increase the sense of common citizenship.
The project of making modern societies more user-
friendly is partly a project of exploiting the unre-
alised social potential of the market and of
expanding the area of life which is not mediated by
the market. The determinants of health contain a
message about our social needs and our potential
for social motivation to which the institutions of
our society must adapt.
The quality of the social environment is clearly the
next big project facing developed societies. The
increasing interest in ideas like stakeholding soci-
eties, communitarianism and social cohesion show
how this project is moving up the political agenda.
There is now ample evidence that the real human
benefits of continued economic growth are subject
to sharply diminishing returns in the developed
world. As well as posing environmental problems,
further increases in the absolute material standards
are now less important to our subjective welfare
than psychosocial factors influenced by income
inequalities and the quality of social relations. As
Frank (1996) has shown, the individual desire for
increased income is better understood as a desire to
improve one's relatiw position in society than as a
desire for economic growth with no change in rela-
tive position.
To say that we do not need economic growth as
much as we did, or as poorer countries still do, does
not mean an end to technical change. Instead it
means thinking about qualitative rather than quan-
titative change. We need continued innovation
partly to save resources and decrease the impact of
economic activity on the environment; we also need
innovation and qualitative improvements to deal
with the incoherent material infrastructure of our
society - but that need not involve quantitative
growth. We need to maintain international compet-
itiveness; but this is consistent with the central pro-
ject of improving the psychosocial quality of life
throughout society
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